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PANEL
STATUS, PROGRESS, AND INTEGRATION
OF LAWYERS OF COLOR IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
THE HONORABLE STERLING JOHNSON, JR.*

I would like to begin by thanking the committee for inviting
me here. It has been an eye-opener. I never dreamed that I would
see so many faces of color in academia, but just looking out over
this audience. I can see that we have made some progress. The
more you live, the more you learn. We have come a long way, yet
we have a long way to go.
I have been around a long time. In fact, I have been in this
profession since before many of you were born. I can remember
starting out as a New York City police officer when black officers
were not allowed to ride in radio cars. I can remember when I was
an assistant United States Attorney; there were only three of us. I
was the only one for a couple of years, then two others were hired.
Eventually, I was appointed to the bench in the Eastern District of
New York. I learned that, in over 200 years, out of the thousands of
persons who had been appointed to the federal bench since 1789,
less than 100 had been persons of color; African-Americans.
The first African-American district court judge in the United
States was Dick Parsons. 1 There was a convention or seminar held
in his honor in Chicago. They decided to have a dinner and lunch
eon for him, and he thought, "Why limit it to just me, why not all of
the Article III judges in the country?" We flew in from all over the
country. American Airlines provided the travel, Marriott provided
the hotel, Ossie Davis and Ruby Dee were the master and mistress
* Federal District Judge for the Eastern District of New York. B.A., 1963,
Brooklyn College; LL.B., 1966, Brooklyn Law School.
1. Judge Parsons was appointed to the federal bench in 1961 by President John F.
Kennedy. Other sources consider William Hastie to be the first African-American fed
eral judge. Judge Hastie was appointed federal judge for the Virgin Islands bench by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1937. See ABRAHAM L. DAVIS, BLACKS IN THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: NEUTRAL ARBITERS OR JUDICIAL AcnVISTS? 3 (1989).
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of ceremony, and all of these African-American judges showed up
and they were counted. They had a seminar on a Saturday and
some of the "old timers" told stories of how it was to be a pioneer
and what it was like to be an African-American judge.
I think one of the most poignant stories was told by Constance
Baker Motley.2 She was the first African-American female judge in
the United States. She told a story of how the judges in her court
used to have dinner meetings two or three times a year at a place
called the Century Club. The Century Club was then a club where
women, black or white, were not allowed above the first floor. She
. later on found out that she was allowed above the first floor only
because some of her colleagues told the club management that she
was the secretary for the judges.
I think Jimmy Carter, in four years, appointed thirty or thirty
three African-American judges to the bench. I think President
Clinton has appointed thirty or thirty-three in two or three years.
We still have a little less than a hundred. We have made some pro
gress, but we still have a long way to go.
So far, I have only talked about the judiciary. I have to say
something about my brother here, Zachary Carter. I came to the
bench in 1991 and at that time there were only three prosecutors of
color out of a total of 140 prosecutors in the Eastern District of
New York. There were three African-American women and no Af
rican-American men. When I spoke to the powers that be, some of
whom were my friends, I would ask them, "Why not hire diversity?
That is the ,key." I was always told, "We could not find any." How
ever, I used to see people being interviewed who had more experi
ence than the people who were interviewing them.
In the Eastern District of New York, sixty-seven percent of the
population is African-American. Many are from Haiti and other
Caribbean nations. However, only three prosecutors were African
American, and that was a disgrace. When Zachary Carter was ap
pointed, he was one of, at most, three African-American United
States Attorneys. He is now one of twelve. When he came to the
United States Attorney's Office, he hired one African-American
for each of the first nine months that he was there, so it went from
three to about twelve. He said he was hiring more, so we have
come a long way, but we have got a long way to go.
I do think that this has always been a white-male profession.
2. Senior Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Judge Motley was appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966.

1997]

STATUS, PROGRESS, AND INTEGRATION

113

This group has not wanted people that do not look like them in the
profession. I think academicians like yourselves have a great, great
role to play. You have a lot of power, and you influence a lot of
young lives. I congratulate you for what you are doing, and urge
you to continue to do more. Thank you.
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ZACHARY CARTER*

The issues addressed by Renee Landers and Judge Johnson are
related to evaluating substantive issues of racial disparity in charg
ing and in sentencing. The development of the Department of Jus
tice's policies with respect to racial disparity in charging decisions,
to the extent that such a policy is verified to exist, has been substan
tially and constructively impacted upon by President Clinton's ap
pointment of twelve African-American United States Attorneys
over the past three years. When we make progress and diversify,
particularly in public sector jobs with significant levels of responsi
bility, whether in the judiciary or the executive branch, we must
exploit those opportunities.
I believe that the history of minorities in this country has been
a history of opportunities denied, opportunities lost, and opportuni
ties that have not been properly exploited. In the 1960s, we had the
opportunity to take advantage of fiscal resources that, to some ex
tent, may have been indiscriminately thrown at problems. If our
own community had taken those fiscal resources and not pocketed
that money, but rather had found constructive ways of investing it
in the future, in our kids, and in education, perhaps the progress
that we witness today would be even greater than it has been.
Today, the same fiscal resources are not being devoted to so
cial problems that are of particular concern to minorities. How
ever, we do have human resources that have been steered in the
direction of those problems. These human resources are us: you, as
African-American members of the academy, African-American
practitioners on the bench and in the Department of Justice, and in
other positions of government. People of color in these positions
have the opportunity to make decisions that affect other persons of
color. I suggest that we should exploit the opportunities presented
by having these human resources in place.
Sterling Johnson talked about the number of African-Ameri
cans that I have hired since I have been a United States Attorney.
This is a reflection of my assumption that I will be the last United
States Attorney of color appointed. I behave as if I am going to be
the last and as if there is going to be no tomorrow. When I leave, I
want to have stockpiled the office with enough qualified African
Americans to create an enduring legacy. This is because future

* United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York. B.A., 1972, Cornell
University; J.D., 1975, New York University School of Law.
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judges are going to be drawn from the ranks of people I have hired.
High Department of Justice officials are going to be drawn from
those ranks. Members of the academy are going to be drawn from
those ranks, and future United States Attorneys are going to be
drawn from the ranks of people who have been former Assistant
United States Attorneys. Therefore, I think it is very important
that we take advantage of the opportunities that we have.
I return now to the question of racial disparity addressed by
Renee Landers. This issue arises in a number of different contexts.
The formal working group of African-American United States At
torneys has focused particularly on the controversy over crack co
caine and powder cocaine and the differing treatment these drugs
receive under federal sentencing guidelines. There is a one hun
dred-to-one ratio of sentencing between crack cocaine and powder
cocaine. 1 One of the things that is interesting about the develop
ment of this issue is that African-Americans are not monolithic in
our views, nor should we be. No one else is. There is no reason for
African-Americans and other persons of color to hold identical
opinions on this issue. There were those in the working group who
were strong advocates for equalization and there were those who
felt that some disparity was justified. Despite these differences,
there was consensus in the group that one hundred-to-one did not
represent a warranted level of disparity. The current, arbitrarily
high ratio has swept in young offenders, at the bottom of the drug
trafficking organizations, and has subjected them to unnecessarily
harsh terms of imprisonment. It was agreed by the working group
that the Sentencing Commission should be directed, having failed
to obtain equalization, to go back to the drawing board and suggest
an alternative ratio that will more properly reflect the real differ
ence in the impact on minority communities of crack drug
trafficking.
This is an example of how you can have an impact, if you want
to. The amendment to the legislation that just passed, with respect
to the Sentencing Guideline Commission proposal for equalization,
was attached to a bill that otherwise would have rejected equaliza
tion and left the one hundred-to-one ratio in place. It instead spe
cifically directs the Sentencing Guidelines Commission to go back
to the drawing board, to do some additional research, and suggest
alternative ratios that might more fairly represent a rational crack
1.

See

u.s. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.1(c) (1995).
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cocaine enforcement and sentencing policy. This example shows
that we can have an impact if we choose to.
With respect to racial disparity in general, there are a number
of studies that have been presented to the Sentencing Guidelines
Commission that suggest there is disparity in charging decisions. 2
The studies have addressed charging decisions related to firearms
offenses and decisions relating to whether or not the prosecutor
moves the court for sentencing relief for a defendant who has testi
fied against his or her accomplices. The raw data suggests that
there may be disparities based on race. 3 The Department of Justice
is now doing its own study to determine whether this is a warranted
or unwarranted disparity.4
It is very important for serious academicians to look at the raw
data and to determine whether or not there is unwarranted, as dis
tinguished from warranted, disparity. Let me give you a gross ex
ample. I am not going to apologize in the least for the fact that
between 99% and 100% of all defendants that I prosecute in the
Eastern District of New York for mafia-related organized crime are
Italian. This is a demographic fact of life. No one would pretend
that it constitutes an unwarranted disparity or constitutes some
form of discrimination that 100% of the persons who are prose
cuted for mafia-related organized crime offenses happen to be Ital
ian, because the mafia is, last time I checked, not an equal
opportunity organization. It is self-selecting.
This is true to a lesser degree with respect to crack cocaine and
its distribution and impact on minority communities. Crack has vis
ited itself on minority communities more than on other communi
ties. 5 Because of cultural phenomena, that you and the academy
are in a better position to analyze and explain to the rest of us,
traffickers in crack have been predominantly minorities. 6 It
presents a money-making enterprise for a lot of young African
2. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REpORT TO THE CONGRESS: CO·
CAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 70 (1995).
3. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 107 (1994) (90% of federal
crack cocaine defendants are African-American); see also United States v. Clary, 846 F.
Supp. 768, 786 n.52 (E.D. Mo.) (92.6% of all defendants in crack cocaine cases are
African-American), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1172
(1995).
4. See Drew S. Days III, Race and the Federal Criminal Justice System: A Look at
the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 179 (1996).
5. See Clary, 34 F.3d at 714 (citing 132 CONGo REC. S7123-01 (daily ed. June 9,
1986» ("crack has captured the ghetto").
6.

See id.
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American men and women who have been denied the opportunity
for economic development in other legitimate spheres. Crack has
historically attracted more African-Americans than others to the
distribution trade. So when we, particularly African-American
United States Attorneys, are called upon, are literally begged by
minority communities, to use federal resources for change and
place them at the disposal of disintegrating African-American com
munities to save them from the onslaught of the crack trade, we use
the ·crude tool that we have. That tool has a disparate impact on
African-American males by way of sentencing.7 As people of color
who hold positions of authority in the judiciary, in the executive
branch, and in the academy, we must take advantage of the oppor
tunities available to us to help resolve these problems. Thank you.

7.

See id.
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*

I am not an academician. I guess I am kind of a street-brawler
lawyer. I want to return to the issue of diversity in the judiciary. I
have served on the Western Regional Judicial Nominating Council
for about three years now. This is an eleven member committee,
consisting of either single practitioners or lawyers from small firms.
This committee is unusual in a couple of ways. First, before William
Weld became Governor of Massachusetts, there was just one com
mittee which sat in the Boston area, and all of its members were
from huge firms. Today I think we have a slightly different situa
tion. I do not know the exact numbers, but Governor Weld has, I
am sure, appointed close to fifty percent or more women and mi
norities to judgeships. If there is an equally qualified white male
candidate and white female candidate for a judgeship, he will al
most always choose the white female. If there is an equally quali
fied white male candidate and a black female candidate, he will
almost assuredly choose the black female. If there is a white male
candidate and a Hispanic candidate, he will almost always choose
the Hispanic candidate.
I am one of two Puerto Rican members on the Western Re
gional Judicial Nominating Council. This is another aspect of the
committee which represents a departure from past practices. In
keeping with this trend, I do not know how many of you have no
ticed that our police commission here in Springfield has two Puerto
Rican members. The present Mayor was very much criticized for
these appointments. Even a lot of members of the Puerto Rican
community did not realize what a strange thing it was to have two
Puerto Ricans on the police commission.
The same mystery surrounds the Judicial Nominating Commis
sion. Nobody knows who we are except people who want judge
ships, and nobody really seems to care who is or is not on it. Now,
the judicial nomination process is political because it is a political
appointment. A judgeship is a governor's appointment, and any
time a governor appoints someone, it is a political decision. A lot
of this depends on what kind of governor you have. I happen to
think Governor Weld is a little bit progressive. If there is not a
political issue involved and there is a minority candidate, he will
* Attorney at law practicing with the finn of Alicea and Nagel in Springfield,
Massachusetts. B.A., 1968, University of Puerto Rico; J.D., 1972, University of Puerto
Rico Law School.
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probably appoint the minority candidate. However, if there is a mi
nority candidate for a judgeship and the governor needs to appoint
another candidate for political reasons, I can say with confidence
that he will appoint that other candidate. Those are just the reali
ties of life. Obviously, if somebody who ran your successful guber
natorial campaign then applies for a judgeship, I think you are
going to treat them very well. Another governor who chose not to
do that lost his bid for re-election and did not understand why. You
tum into the man you used to hate, but those are realities of life.
I think, as practicing lawyers, you should really strive to find
out what kind of mechanism there is in your particular community
to choose judges and try to get on that committee. Besides your
practice, that is probably the most important contribution you can
make to your legal profession. You may not know the governor of
your state, but I am sure that you know somebody who does. If you
can get that person to speak on your behalf, you may be able to get
an appointment to a Judicial Nominating Committee. You will then
be in a position to screen the candidates, encourage minority folks
to apply, and use your vote to give that person a way to a judicial
appointment.
Serving on a Judicial Nominating Committee has another ad
vantage. Although I am not speaking for myself, it can prepare you
if, at some point, you would like to be a judge. Serving on the com
mittee allows you to know a little about the process and start to
learn some of the ways that can help you prepare yourself to be a
better candidate.
Apart from my law practice, I really enjoy serving on this com
mittee. I will not give it up. I will give up everything else before I
give that up. It is a really exciting thing for me. One of the by
products of our committee was the appointment of a wonderful
judge who is with us here today, Judge Jacques Leroy, who is one of
two black judges in the Western Region of Massachusetts. The
eleven member committee voted for him unanimously, which shows
us that things are changing.
Five or six years ago I went into the court house, and besides
the defendant, I counted eleven other people who were minorities
who were there in their official capacity, including the defense law
yer, the judge, and a probation officer. There is some hope there,
and we do see more and more diverse faces at the court house.
There is still a lot to be done, but I have found that my job on this
committee really gives me the opportunity to make a hands-on con
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tribution to the kinds of judges that we have in our community. I
encourage you to do the same in your community. Thank you.
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RENEE LANDERS*

Right now I am on loan to the Department of Health and
Human Services as a deputy general counsel, assigned to work on a
number of health care related issues and regulatory issues for that
department. I want to thank all of you for attending this final panel
of the First Annual Northeastern People of Color Legal Scholarship
Conference. I understand the conference has been a very interest
ing and profitable one.
The topic of this panel is Status, Progress, and Integration of
Lawyers of Color in the Legal Profession. I think that all of the
folks on the panel would like to try to build some connections be
tween these issues and their relationship to the legal academy.
There might be some relationship between what practicing lawyers
do and how the legal academy can help with the process of integrat
ing them more fully into the legal profession.
Over the last couple of days there has been much discussion
about the challenges that the country is facing in terms of policies
related to affirmative action. This discussion ties very closely into
the subject of the panel for today. The legal basis for affirmative
action is certainly eroding, given the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1 and the more re
cent decision of the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas. 2 The legal
and political context that has arisen as a result of Adarand and
Hopwood may be cause for some realistic assessment about the fu
ture. I hope that the panel here today can try to turn that realism
around into some positive thoughts about what legal scholars in the
profession can do together to try to build a better public consensus
for inclusiveness in the law and in the larger society.
A few years ago, when I was a law faculty member at Boston
College Law School, I attended the annual meeting of the Associa
tion of American Law Schools in San Francisco, where former
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham of the United States Court of Ap
* Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. A.B.,
Radcliffe College; J.D., Boston College Law School. Member, Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court Committee to Study Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts; member,
Board of Overseers, Harvard University.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that all racial classifications imposed by any
governmental entity must be examined under strict scrutiny standard).
2. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) (state university law
school's admission process giving race-based preferences violates Fourteenth Amend
ment Equal Protection Clause).
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peals for the Third Circuit was the keynote speaker for the lunch
eon at the conference. At that conference he observed that: '
The great vision that we as lawyers have as to the potential
role of the law, or in contrast the insensitivity and callousness
that many lawyers now have, may be more attributable to the
mentoring process and examples set by our law professors than
many would want to concede. In many ways, [law professors] are
... the "high priest[s]" of our profession. There are hundreds of
subtle and occasionally even some blatant messages that law
professors display in law schools. Students learn quickly whether
Professor "X" dreams things that never were and says "why
not?', [sic] or whether s/he believes that, now that one has tenure
our nation is close to the best of all possible worlds. They per
ceive whether a professor believes there should be any demands
for change in the present legal process and rules of law for any
thing more fundamental than a modest amendment to the Fed
eral Rules of Evidence .... 3

In sum, former Judge Higginbotham, now Professor Higginbot
ham,4 believes law schools and law professors have a profound ef
fect on the type of lawyers that law graduates become. Given that
significant influence, he believes that law schools and the people
who are a part of the legal academy have to take some steps to try
to educate students, judges, and the general public about the nature
of bias and how that kind of bias can be avoided. I think that Judge
Higginbotham's optimism about how the academy can contribute to
this process is well founded.
I thought I would talk about two issues today in introducing
this panel. First, a success story about a contemporary effort to in
tegrate people of color more fully into the legal profession and,
most notably, into the federal judiciary; and second, an example of
another scholarly movement that has contributed to the develop
ment of the law in ways that have tended toward more inclusiveness
and has had a positive impact on the development of the law.
Why would I talk about the judicial selection process? One of
the duties that I had while I was in the Office of Policy Develop
ment at the Department of Justice was to participate in the judicial
selection process. For a time, we also organized the selection pro
cess for United States Attorneys around the country. I think Presi
3. Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Remarks at Association of American Law
Schools Luncheon (Jan. 6, 1990), in 1990 ASS'N AM. L. SCH. PROC. 177, 180.
4. Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
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dent Clinton's record of judicial appointments has been a sterling
example of how diversity can be achieved in accommodation with
other kinds of goals and how much progress can be made.
When President Clinton came into office, he had three basic
goals for the judicial appointments process: first, to choose judges
who have the intelligence, integrity, and experience to serve in
these vital positions; second, to depoliticize the judicial selection
process by choosing judges who are committed to the rule of law
and not to ideological litmus tests, and by so doing, to restore civi
lized consideration of judicial nominees and to renounce the rank
or partisanship considerations of some previous judicial nominees;
and third, to reflect the rich diversity of the bar and the country in
choosing among the many excellent candidates who have been rec
ommended to him. 5
But what is the Clinton record on this issue? Let's put this into
context. There are 847 Article III judicial positions. When Presi
dent Clinton took office, there were 113 vacancies, representing
13% of the federal judiciary.6 The situation was alarming because
in many districts tJIere was a serious shortage of judicial personnel.
To date, the President has nominated and the Senate has confirmed
187 federal judges, and there are 31 nominations pending in the
Senate. The President's record of appointments reflects the revolu
tion that has occurred in the legal profession in the last twenty-five
or thirty years. Record numbers of women and minority profes
sionals are graduating from the nation's graduate schools. Presi
dent Clinton has an unsurpassed record of appointing a qualified
and diverse pool of people. Sixty-four percent of the President's
judicial appointments have been rated well-qualified by the Ameri
can Bar Association, a higher percentage than his three predeces
sors in office.7 The President has achieved that outstanding record
of excellence while, at the same time, appointing judges who really
do reflect the rich diversity of the bar in our country, although, ob
viously, one can always improve on these numbers. About 26% of
President Bush's judicial appointments were women and minori
ties,8 and overall, almost 51 % of President Bush's appointees are in
5. See Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICA
TURE 287, 297 (1993).
6. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examina
tion, 78 JUDICATURE 276, 279 (1995).
7. See id. at 285.
8. See Henry J. Reske, A Report Card on Clinton's Judges, 80 A.B.A. J. 16, 16
(1994). According to statistics compiled by The Alliance for Justice Judicial Selection
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the ABA's well-qualified rating.9 Seventeen percent of President
Reagan's appointments were women and minorities,lO and overall,
55% of these appointments were in the well-qualified rating. l l By
comparison, 56% President Clinton's appointees are women and
minoriti~s,12 and 64% have the ABA's highest rating, the well-qual
ified rating. 13 These statistics demonstrate that diversity and qual
ity are not mutually exclusive characteristics, although some who
have cast the affirmative action debate in terms of racial prefer
ences might suggest that they are. This is a success story. People at
every level of the decision-making process, from those who hire stu
dents upon their departure from law school to those who choose
candidates for the very pinnacle of the profession, selecting federal
judgeships, can really think more creatively about ways to diversify
the profession.
The second point I wanted to make is how scholarship relates
to public policy. I think that the academy can learn a great deal
from the approach taken by the feminist legal scholarship move
ment. I understand that the analogy is not perfect because there
are differences in the way gender issues are discussed and received
in this society and the way in which issues of color are discussed and
received. From the beginning, the feminist legal scholarship move
ment made an effort to encourage practical scholarship that directly
addressed public policy issues. Scholars studied the impact of di
vorce on women and children and the effectiveness of the way in
which courts handle domestic violence cases. These scholarly writ
ings gave policy makers information that they could use directly in
formulating public policy. The challenge for the academy in the
race area is to try to emulate that example.
People like me, who made the transition from the academy to
government work, can make a valuable contribution to the govern
ment because we can build bridges between the academy and the
formulation of government policy. For example, when I went to the
Project, 26.6% of President Bush's judicial appointments were women and minorities.
See id.
9. See Goldman, supra note 6, at 285 n.23.
10. But see Reske, supra note 8, at 16. According to statistics compiled by the
Alliance for Justice Judicial Selection Project, 13.2% of President Reagan's appoint
ments were women and minorities. See id.
11. See Goldman, supra note 6, at 285 n.23.
12. See Sheldon Goldman & Matthew D. Saronson, Clinton'S Non-traditional
Judges: Creating a More Representative Bench, 78 JUDICATURE 68, 70 (1994) (in 1994,
56 of 88 appointments were of "nontraditional" candidates).
13. See Goldman, supra note 6, at 285.
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Justice Department in 1993, I was put in charge of implementing
the Attorney General's directive to develop a more coherent and
proactive alternative dispute resolution policy for the Department
of Justice. There are a lot of people in the Justice Department who
think that all cases should be litigated all the way to the Supreme
Court, if that's what they require. They think alternative dispute
resolution has absolutely no relevance to the realm of litigation
whatsoever. I· assembled a working group from various compo
nents of the department and consulted broadly among practition
ers. I made sure the group of practitioners was diverse and
included people of color and women. I also consulted with legal
academics who had credentials in the field to make sure that the
policy that was created was something that was going be credible in
the academic community as well as among practitioners. People in
the academy can make a large contribution to the public policy de
bate by working on issues that have practical implications, and by
making sure that the academic input is fed into the process of public
policy formulation.
There have been a number of legal academics who have had a
profound impact on the way policy has operated in the current ad
ministration. For example, Professor Chris Edley at Harvard Law
School worked with me on the White House staff and the Presi
dent's Affirmative Action Review. Drew Days, who served as the
Solicitor General, as well as several of his deputies, all came from
academic environments. Walter Dullenger, a Duke Law School
professor, has been the head of the Office of Legal Counsel and has
been responsible for giving advice to the President about legal is
sues that affect the operation of the government. Eventually, these
people will presumably go back to the academic institutions, and I
think that will provide good cross-fertilization. Thus, it is possible
for the academy and the profession to work together on some of
these issues. Thank you.
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JACQUELINE BERRIEN*

In the past six months, both the Washington Post and the New
York Times have published results from opinion polls. The Wash
ington Post article about race in America discussed a poll in which
whites were asked what percentage of the population they believed
was African-American. 1 More recently, the New York Times re
ported on a poll of attitudes about immigration, which asked whites
what percentage of people they believe were recent immigrants. 2
In both instances, the figures that were offered were wildly inflated.
In fact, they were virtually doubled. In both the Washington Post
and New York Times, whites said that they believed that African
Americans were about 25% of the population, which is more than
double the actual representation of African-Americans in the popu
lation. 3 There were similar wide discrepancies, wild discrepancies
actually, between the estimated number of people who whites be
lieved were immigrants. 4
I start with these statistics because I think that, in this discus
sion, it is important to have some perspective on the real numbers.
It is, perhaps, easy for those of us sitting in this room to overesti
mate the degree of influence or the degree of representation that
people of color have in the legal profession. According to the 1990
census, 3.3% of all attorneys in the United States are African
American. African-American lawyers are the largest subset of at
torneys of color. The numbers go .down from there: 2.5% of attor
neys are Hispanic, 1.4% of attorneys are Asian or Pacific
American, and 0.18% of attorneys are Native-American. 5 A 1995
New York University Law Review article, which reviewed current
enrollment in ABA accredited law schools around the country, re
ported that 7.2% of the students enrolled in J.D. programs in ABA
approved law schools were African-American, 4.9% were Latino,
5.1 % were Asian or Pacific-American, and 0.7% Native American. 6
* Assistant Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. B.A.,
Oberlin College; J.D., Harvard University.
1. See Malcolm Gladwell, Reality Check: Attitudes and Anxieties About Race,
WASH. POST, Oct. 8,1995, at A26.
2. See Priscilla Labovitz, Immigration-Just the Facts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1996,
at A15.
3. See Gladwell, supra note 1, at A26; Labovitz, supra note 2, at A15.
4. See Gladwell, supra note I, at A26; Labovitz, supra note 2, at A15.
5. See Gladwell, supra note I, at A26; Labovitz, supra note 2, at A15.
6. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry
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I think it is important to start with those statistics. They reveal that
we are still substantially underrepresented in the legal profession.
That underrepresentation is not unique to one segment of the
profession. I have had an opportunity this weekend to interact with
a number of people who are teaching law in various institutions
who feel they are underrepresented. I am a practitioner and I prac
tice law in New York with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Fortu
nately, in my office, I do not feel like a minority. However, in the
practice world at large, I am constantly reminded of my status as
one of very few people, who look like me, who practice law, and
certainly who practice law in the kinds of places that I practice. I
think we have to start with these statistics, because we need to un
derstand where we are numerically right now within the profession.
We must also understand the implications of our status and of the
current developments in our profession on what we have to look
forward to, absent some very, very strong action and responses
right now.
I represent a group of African-American voters in Louisiana
who have intervened in a lawsuit for the purpose of defending the
existence of a majority black congressional district in Louisiana.
The case is Hays v. State,7 and my co-counsel in the case includes
Judge Higginbotham, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, at
torneys from the Department of Justice, and attorneys from the
Louisiana Attorney General's Office. We tried this case in October
of last year, and at one point during the proceedings, one of my
colleagues turned to me and said, "Have you noticed what's wrong
with this picture?" On the other side of the room were a group of
plaintiffs, eleven white and one African-American, who said that
their rights were violated by the existence of a majority African
American congressional district in Louisiana. They said that the
reason they filed this suit was that they believed it was important
under the Equal Protection Clause, for race not to be taken into
account in the districting process. They believed that the existence
of this majority black district stereotyped them, somehow dimin
ished their rights, classified them on the basis of race, and classified
African-Americans on the basis of race. That group of plaintiffs
was represented by eight white male attorneys.
On our side of the room, defending against a Fourteenth
into the Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 829, 860 (1995).
7. 936 F. Supp. 360 (W.O. La. 1996) (per curiam).
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Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim, we represented an Af
rican-American member of Congress and four African-American
voters in the state of Louisiana. We presented testimony from Afri
can-American voters and white voters who resided in the Fourth
Congressional District, ranging from long-time civil rights activists
to a seventy year old nun who lived in Shreveport. She was a native
of the South, stood up on the stand during this case, and said, "I
think that this majority black congressional district is one of the
most important things that has happened in this state because it's
finally breaking down the longstanding exclusion that has occurred,
not only for blacks, but for poor people generally in this state."
Our witnesses were racially diverse; our witnesses were diverse in
terms of age; our witnesses were diverse in terms of background;
our witnesses were diverse in every way, economically and other
wise. The counsel table was similarly diverse: there were four Afri
can-American men, one Native American woman, two white males,
two white women, and myself representing that group of defend
ants, the people who were defending the Fourth Congressional
District.
I think that example really does summarize to me what it
means for me to be an African-American woman attorney engaged
in the kind of law practice that I have, and why I think it is impor
tant and will continue to be important for me to practice this kind
of law. But I do not pigeon-hole. I do not believe it is the only
important practice. I believe that we can make those kinds .of con
tributions and make a difference in many ways. In some ways we
make a statement simply when we stand up at the podium in the
courtroom. Those of us who teach make a statement when we
stand up at the podium in the classroom. We are often very con
scious of what that statement is: that people are expecting certain
things, some rightly, some wrongly, because they see a particular
kind of person.
While it is important for us to always challenge or be critical of
efforts to pigeon-hole or label us, I think it is also important for us
to be very aware of the ways that the current political atmosphere
can take that resistance and direct it against us. For example, last
week a three-judge court from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, an all-white, three-judge panel, decided that
the University of Texas Law School's affirmative action program
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violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 8 One of
the things that those judges said was that you cannot infer anything
about a person by looking at the color of their skin.9 That is the
fundamental tenet of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court's de
cision was based on the premise that admitting a certain number of,
or giving an admissions preference to, African-American or Mexi
can-American students does not necessarily translate into an in
crease in diversity of viewpoints in the law school. But in some
ways we are all a living testament to the fact that this is just false.
The legal profession is unquestionably different today than it
was 100 years ago because of the presence of more women. It is
unquestionably different today than it was 100 years ago because of
the presence of more attorneys of color. It was certainly clear to
me, in hearing the presentations this morning, that the academy is
unquestionably different from what it was ten years ago when I was
in law school. There are more people of color in the academy today
who are bringing some of their life perspective, some of their own
background and experience, into the classroom and are using them
to analyze an array of topics, including topics that are not overtly
about race. One of the things that they are aware of, in ways that
their colleagues, however well intentioned, may not be aware of, is
that there are racial implications in many subjects that they may not
think of as being overtly racial. As we heard this morning, Dorothy
Brown talked about tax law and noted that we will never uncover
the hidden effects of race if we do not question the impact of race
on subjects that are not overtly racial. The difference between her
and any number of people who have taught tax law before is that
she was willing to ask a question, and she is beginning to get some
answers.
I think that, reasoning from the statistics that I shared earlier,
there are several things that concern me right now about the legal
profession. The most obvious and, to me, the most important is
that we may have reached our high. I would hate to think that
3.3% of all lawyers in this country being African-American is as
many as we will ever see. However, we must acknowledge a very
real trend in the law that has been accepted at this point by two
federal courts of appeals,lO and that is a rejection of the kind of
8. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996).
9. See id. at 946.
10. See Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), petition for cert.
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3354 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1996) (No. 96-679); Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932.
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affirmative action admissions programs and standards that made it
possible for many of us, including me, to go to law school.
If we are serious about looking at the issue of the status of
lawyers of color in the profession and want to see 3.3% not as the
high point of African-Americans in the profession, but as the begin
ning and the tip of the iceberg as far as what we can achieve in
terms of diversity, the most urgent question is how we are going to
respond to the judicial rejection of the legal principles that made it
possible for the kinds of affirmative action, admissions, recruitment,
and financial aid programs that many of us benefitted from, to con
tinue. The search for that response is beginning now.
If you are in the academy, it is certainly possible to participate
in developing a response to the judges at every level of the federal
judiciary today who are currently saying that the time has come to
stop considering race. I want to suggest that at least part of what
we may need to do is move to thinking more seriously and advocat~
ing more seriously about the next level of response. We have as
sumed, and conceded, for perhaps too long, that the conventional
wisdom about standards for academic success or the criteria that
are appropriate for people to be admitted to law schools, or their
qualifications or their performance, are all inflexible and invariable.
One of the things that was really exciting to me this morning
was hearing scholars discuss ways that they are challenging the or
thodoxy of the institutions in which they work. They are challeng
ing the orthodoxy of legal academia in general and the way law has
been taught for the last 200 years. They are saying, "I am here now,
and I am thinking about it differently. I am bringing a different set
of perspectives to this, and, guess what, you missed something.
Let's talk about that now."
I think the time has never been more urgent to make these
changes, and people are beginning to do so. We must also start to
do this with regard to questions about admissions and student per
formance. We know, or there are many studies that suggest, that
high LSAT scores, for example, do correlate with something. That
something is not success as a lawyer. That something is not bar
passage. That something is not even academic performance over
the life of a student's entire legal career or their law school career.
That something is first-year grades. I think it is critical for us to
begin to ask: Why does our inquiry end there? Why is it acceptable
for a school to define its mission and select the people who ought to
partake in that mission and influence that mission solely on the ba
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sis of one year of performance in a three year program? It makes
no sense. But we have not challenged this selection process, at least
in part because there were other ways of getting around it. What I
am suggesting is that some of the ways we have been able to cir
cumvent law school admissions policies that emphasize LSAT
scores are increasingly being cut off.
In certain parts of the country, where the rejection of affirma
tive action principles has not yet begun in broad scale among the
judiciary, this erosion may not have happened. We must, of course,
continue to fight the judicial trend of rejecting affirmative action.
In the meantime, however, I do think we have got to begin to look
at responses that do not depend entirely on getting good judges or
that do not depend entirely on whether we can get that crucial fifth
vote on the Supreme Court. The reality is, whether you look at the
Adarand Constructors ll decision last term, or the congressional re
districting decisions-Shaw v. Reno,12 Miller v. lohnson 13 -or any
number of other decisions from the Supreme Court over the last
five years, affirmative action is certainly under-active. And yet, I
am not content to believe we have reached our pinnacle.
It is clear that we need to ask whether there is a real and mean
ingful relationship between what we have assumed are the neces
sary qualifications for a job and what is actually required to do that
job successfully. For example, although it is assumed that you have
to have been a federal practitioner with a big firm to be a federal
judge, big firms rarely do federal in-court litigation. This question
ing of old assumptions is already happening in the work place, and
it is time for it to happen in the legal academy. Part of the process
will be to question whether the accepted criteria have, in fact, been
applied and whether they are realistic.
Another part of this process is that those of us who have
gained access must be willing to make it clear that the criteria
should be reexamined. We need to encourage our institutions to be
more open minded, to be more critical of what it is that we say the
academic mission of the institution is and how that mission interacts
with the admissions criteria that we set. It has begun to happen in
terms of hiring in the academy, and it is beginning to happen in the
legal profession. It certainly is time for it to happen in terms of
access to legal education. It is very critical that it happen right now,
11. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
12. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
13. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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given the real possibility that affirmative action programs may come
under increasing attack and, in some instances, may be abandoned
by institutions that are unwilling to fight the battle all the way to
the Supreme Court.
I think this raises a really compelling issue. One of the things
that the federal government is struggling with is what the 'recent
court decisions on affirmative action mean in practical, mechanistic
terms. The federal government must determine what effect these
decisions will have on human resources, offices for federal agencies,
and for contracting officials in federal agencies in terms of what
they can do to try to maintain the progress that has been made in
including more contractors of color and more diversity in the fed
eral work force.
I think something that Judge Johnson said earlier brings this
issue home. The problem is that people are more comfortable hir
ing people who are like themselves, whether it is to work with them
in the same office, or to do a construction project such as paving the
highway in the local community. I think that one of the solutions to
this problem is to try to use available opportunities to institutional
ize, as Mr. Carter is doing, a selection process that demonstrates
that everybody does not have to be from the same background or
have gone to the same schools in order to achieve an effective
work-place. So, in the face of the erosion of affirmative action, our
challenge is to really try to develop and institutionalize selection
criteria and processes that will make it possible to ensure that we
are not capped at 3.3% of the profession. Thank you.
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THE HONORABLE JACQUES LEROY*

Let me first express my real joy at having been a participant in
this conference. It has given me the opportunity to achieve great
intellectual and human gains, and I have met people whom I will
certainly never forget. Let me not forget to thank Leonard Baynes,
very warmly, for putting together an event at which, indeed, so
many gains could be garnered in such a short time.
I would like to stress two things in trying to tie together the
experiences that I have had to the topics which we have been dis
cussing. That is: what do you find when you "get there," and once
you get there, what do you do?
We know that it is not easy to be a practicing lawyer, or to
become a judge in this Commonwealth. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court's Commission on Racial and Ethnic Bias in
the Courts was instituted some time in August of 1990, and issued a
report four years later'! The report very candidly acknowledged
that Massachusetts, which has the oldest Supreme Court in the na
tion, still does not have a black justice on its Supreme Judicial
Court. Additionally, at the time that the report appeared, out of
328 judges in Massachusetts, only twenty-nine were minorities. 2
The report also pointed out that the minority populations, mostly
those of different linguistic backgrounds than English, were clearly
disfavored. 3 The report acknowledged that minority lawyers were
not treated adequately in the court system. 4 The report noted that,
indeed, litigants who have any contact with the courts would be ex
posed to an absence of diversity in certain areas. S The report noted
the importance of having more minority judges.6 So, now we know
the facts.
Now, when you make it "there," what is it that you do? How
do you fulfill your responsibility, and how does all of this tie in with
what we have been discussing this weekend? That is where I would
like to concentrate my very few words. Yesterday we talked about
* Associate Justice, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Hampden County District
Court, Springfield Division. B.A., 1966, College of Saint Martial, University of Haiti;
M.A., 1972, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1978, Harvard University Law School.
1. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, COMM'N TO STUDY RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS IN
THE COURTS, EQUAL JUSTICE: ELIMINATING THE BARRIERS (1994).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

at
at
at
at
id. at

10.
34-35.
117.

149.
108-09.

134

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:111

the vast diversity among us. And clearly, when you hear me speak,
you know we have vast diversity among us. As soon as I open my
mouth, you know that I am somewhat different. Yet, I am one of
you, and there is no way I can segregate myself from you. I have an
accent. It is obvious I was not born here. After a certain age, you
can hardly ever lose your accent. So, there are certain aspects of
yourself over which you have no control and that you cannot put in
a closet because they are so obvious. We cannot control our "pour
soi."
The "en soi," the "ego," the "self," is something different. But,
you may not even have control over that. Take, for example, the
concepts of empathy, objectivity, and hunch, of which we spoke
yesterday. They are all tainted with ego. It was Berta Hernandez
who first brought up the term indivisibility. Later on we heard
from Cheryl Ikemoto how hard it was to achieve objectivity, and
throughout the morning, we heard about the concept of empathy.
All of these concepts are very important in the life of a judge.
If you posit and accept Justice Cardozo's great warning about
the impossibility for anyone to tame his or her ego to such an extent
that the achievement of objectivity would become easy, well then
we understand that we cannot tame that ego. That ego contains all
of these aspects of ourselves which are, at once, different and yet
the same. They are different because we belong to a different race
and ethnicity; we have different historical experiences. They are
the same because we share the same perception. We may be seen
as different, but we are certainly grouped together. And the obvi
ous fact is that I am not white. I may be different from another
black person, but what difference does that make?
At one point the issue was raised that judges sometimes de
cided out of hunches. My position is that this is really not so. We
do research the law, and we do search for objectivity. The problem
is that objectivity is always an ideal. All you can do is try to attain it
in the context of diversity and in the context of a judiciary which is
mostly dominated by non-minority ethnics.
When you are dealing with a court, such as the Springfield Dis
trict Court,7 which has jurisdiction over Springfield, West Spring
field, Agawam, and Longmeadow, you understand that the
population of litigants coming before the court is extremely diverse.
How does a person with a minority background function as a judge
who must make decisions regarding people of very diverse back
7.

Hampden County, Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
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grounds? I turn them to the concept of empathy. When ill-con
ceived, empathy might be in contra disposition to objectivity,
especially when it is an emotional urge that leads you to award for
someone or against someone. But to me, empathy, if it is not to be
contradictory with objectivity, simply means that you pay more
careful attention to the circumstances of a case and the characteris
tics of the litigants in front of you. Empathy then becomes a tool of
analysis. And it is in many circumstances that a district court judge,
whose docket is really ninety percent criminal, will have to exercise
that kind of empathy-an empathy that is neutral but systematic
because if you are going to approximate objectivity, you must do so,
not only as to the law, but also as to the persons to whom that law
applies.
For example, a criminal matter which clearly is going to be
tried to a jury often involves various pretrial motions and motions
in limine. At this stage, the exercise of empathy becomes critical.
Indeed, examination of Fourth Amendment determinations regard
ing the admissibility of evidence seized as a result of a stop-and-·
frisk or custodial stops illustrates the importance of the concept of
empathy. It is in those determinations of whether the evidence is
admissible that you really have to exercise empathy in a systematic
way.
For example, in the case of a stop-and-frisk, all the prosecution
has to show is a reasonable suspicion that a crime was afoot. That
suspicion is considered well-grounded if it is based on location and
evasion. That is to say, if the defendant was caught in a high crime
area, or high drug area, and if the defendant showed any behavior
that could be considered evasive when confronted by the police, the
suspicion is considered well-grounded.
Now, you know that "high crime areas" have become synony
mous with inner-city neighborhoods. And neighborhoods are
places where people live, places where they have a right to be.
Now, think of evasiveness and reconsider that defendant who has
had previous contacts with the police in his residential neighbor
hood and who has literally refused to make himself available to the
police at a time of confrontation. You understand that you really
have to look at motions to suppress with an empathy that is system
atic and that looks at all of these various aspects. Indeed, a motion
to suppress is dispositive of the case, particularly when you are
dealing with drugs, because if you suppress the evidence on the ba
sis that the stop-and-frisk was improper, well then, there is no evi
dence and there is not much of a case left for prosecution. But your
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oath requires that you deny the motion if the legal standards have
been met by the police.
If you consider motions in limine, when the standard is not
whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant were vio
lated, but rather whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence
would far outweigh its probative value, you have to exercise the
same care. Why, for example, should certain criminal records,
mostly dealing with the same crime for which the defendant is going
to be tried, be accepted into evidence? Yes, there is a certain pro
bative value to having such evidence, but what about the prejudice?
You have to be very careful when dealing with that kind of issue,
certainly in the midst of trial when impeachment of the testifying
defendant is raised. Indeed, you have to be equally empathetic to
wards defendants who are not minorities. This is true not only be
cause you have to be fair, but also because we have a new
population of defendants appearing before the district courts who
have not often appeared here before. We now have Russian de
fendants, Polish defendants, and Vietnamese defendants. You have
to show them the very same empathy that you would apply to a
defendant who is from the same ethnic or racial minority group as
yourself, or to other non-minority defendants. In that sense, you
tend to achieve, at the same time, both fairness and objectivity in
your holdings.
Clearly, judges and most lawyers do not publish as extensively
as members of the academy. Members of the academy are the ones
who bring forth certain rules of analysis which allow the judge to
make decisions that have a strong basis. In this regard I would sug
gest the reading of David Harris's excellent article in the Indiana
Law Journal,s which contains a very interesting critical analysis of
the issue of stop-and-frisk. The article shows how the theory has
evolved from the requirement that articulable facts be demon
strated, taken with all of the reasonable inferences that could be
made from those facts that would warrant the deprivation of lib
erty. The theory has evolved significantly to the extent that the
standard now includes: first, not only location and evasion, but also
great deference to the police officer who first determines that it is a
high crime area, second, whether there was evasiveness, and third,
whether there was any kind of danger.
Once you "get there," you must really try to make your being
8. David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. LJ. 659 (1994).
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there significant. To a judge, sworn to uphold the law, and who
cannot legislate, the use of empathy as an analytical tool is very
helpful. In particular, empathy allows a minority judge to approach
the ideal of objective fairness by helping him to pay close attention
to the circumstances of cases of which he has a unique
understanding.
I would like to conclude by thanking the members of the acad
emy for the kind of work that they are doing. That the Indiana Law
Journal article is one that was written from the perspective that we
heard so much about yesterday and today illustrates that empathy
can and should be applied in civil matters as well. As Renee Land
ers has stated, the interaction between the academy and the judici
ary, and between the academy and the public, can only be
beneficial to members of the public and, specifically, to members of
the various minorities about whom we have been talking this week.
Thank you.

